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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Amanda Diaz contends two different officers offered improper testimony during
her trial, one commenting on her decision to exercise her Fourth Amendment rights, and
the other offering opinion testimony which spoke to the ultimate question the jury was
being asked to decide.  She asserts that each instance of improper testimony amounts
to prosecutorial misconduct, and so, constitutes fundamental error.  As such, this Court
should vacate the verdict and judgment for driving under the influence of drugs and
remand the case for further proceedings.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officers pulled Ms. Diaz over after a third party reported her car had engaged in
a reckless pattern of driving.  (Tr., p.159, L.9 - p.160, L.20.)1  However, the officer who
initiated the stop testified he did not see any improper driving pattern as Ms. Diaz was
stopped properly at a stoplight when he found her, and she immediately pulled over
when he activated overhead his lights.  (Tr., p.165, L.20 - p.166, L.12.)  Nevertheless,
based on the fact that Ms. Diaz was fidgety and talking rapidly and erratically, that
officer suspected she was under the influence of something, and he asked Officer Moe
to take over the investigation.  (Tr., p.162, L.13 - p.163, L.22.)
Officer Moe decided to have Ms. Diaz perform the field sobriety tests
(hereinafter,  FSTs).   (Tr.,  p.175, Ls.6-8.)   Ms. Diaz told Officer Moe she suffered from
1 While the transcripts in this case are provided in several independently bound and
paginated volumes, unless otherwise indicated, all references to “Tr.” in this brief refer
to the volume containing the transcripts of the hearing on Ms. Diaz’s motion to suppress
and the jury trial.
2several medical conditions, including fibromyalgia.  (Tr., p.174, L.18 - p.178, L.22; see
also Exhibit 1 (audio recording of Officer Moe’s initial conversation with Ms. Diaz, in
which she told him about her fibromyalgia at approximately 2:30).)  Another officer
acknowledged at trial that fibromyalgia could have affected her ability to perform some
of the actions required in the FSTs adequately.  (See Tr., p.285, L.16 - p.286, L.4.)
Ms. Diaz also told Officer Moe she had prescriptions for several medications, including
Oxycodone, Adderall, Zoloft, Navane, and Amitriptyline, but had not taken those
medications for several days.  (Tr., p.176, Ls.2-7.)  Additionally, when Officer Moe
asked about an apparent needle mark on her arm, she told him she had received
treatment at a hospital a few days prior.  (Tr., p.172, Ls.5-12.)  During the FSTs,
Ms. Diaz passed the horizontal nystagmus test, but failed the walk-and-turn and one-
leg-stand tests.  (Tr., p.182, Ls.13-16, p.191, Ls.10-11, p.195, Ls.7-8.)  Ms. Diaz
submitted to a breathalyzer test at that time, blowing .000 on both samples.  (Tr., p.197,
Ls.2-19.)
Based on the FSTs, Officer Moe suspected Ms. Diaz might be under the
influence of drugs, and so, he asked Officer Carter to perform a drug recognition
evaluation (hereinafter, DRE).2  (Tr., p.198, Ls.14-23.)  Officer Carter started the DRE at
12:30 a.m., almost two hours after he was asked to perform the DRE, and did not
complete it until nearly 2 a.m.  (See Tr., p.288, Ls.10-21.)  He noted that Ms. Diaz
continued to struggle on the psychophysical tests, such as the walk-and-turn and one-
leg stand.  (Tr., p.260, Ls.1-9, p.263, L.8 - p.265, L.5, p.266, Ls.1-25, p.267, Ls.7-22.)
However, he admitted her performance on one of those tests, the modified Romberg,
2 Officer Moe was present during the DRE.  (Tr., p.199, Ls.13-16.)
3though technically outside normal limits, “wasn’t a big influence” in his evaluation of her.
(Tr., p.260, Ls.1-9, p.287, Ls.5-25.)  Officer Carter also noted Ms. Diaz fell in the normal
range on many of the physiological tests he performed as part of the DRE.  (Tr., p.257,
Ls.13-19 (all three pulse checks within normal limits), p.257, L.21 - p.258, L.1 (pupil
dilation normal in normal light), p.258, Ls.4-13 (no unusual horizontal nystagmus),
p.268, Ls.14-18 (body temperature within normal limits), p.269, Ls.3-6 (pupil dilation in a
dark room with indirect light within normal limits), p.269, Ls.15-16 (pupil reaction to
direct light in a dark room normal), p.269, Ls.22-25 (noting nothing of concern in her
nose or mouth); but see Tr., p.259, Ls.7-24 (eyes unable to cross/converge), p.268,
Ls.13-14 (low blood pressure), p.269, Ls.11-12 (seeing no rebound dilation in the dark
room, direct light test).)  Ultimately, Officer Carter testified at trial that it was his opinion
that Ms. Diaz “was impaired while she was operating that vehicle.”  (Tr., p.276,
Ls.21-22.)
Officer Moe testified that the officers needed to verify the DRE conclusions by
testing a blood or urine sample.  (Tr., p.200, Ls.16-24.)  Ms. Diaz agreed to provide a
urine sample, but, as no female officers were available to take that sample, she agreed
to provide the sample at the jail.  (R., p.55.)  However, when talking about that decision
at trial, Officer Moe also told the jury, “There was a discussion of whether she would
submit to a blood draw having Meridian Fire and Paramedics come and take a blood
sample from her.  She did not consent to that, but she did agree to provide a sample at
the jail.”  (Tr., p.201, Ls.14-17.)
On the way to the jail, Ms. Diaz passed out, and Officer Moe had her taken to the
hospital for evaluation.  (R., p.55.)  At the hospital, Ms. Diaz was asked to provide the
4urine sample.  (R., p.55.)  She attempted to do so, but was unable to provide a sufficient
quantity.  (R., p.55.)  Officers told her she would be catheterized if she did not give a
proper sample, but Ms. Diaz “screamed that she did not want to be catheterized,”
primarily due to the fact that she had been the victim of sexual assaults in the past.
(R., p.55.)  Working in concert with law enforcement, hospital staff proceeded to forcibly
catheterized Ms. Diaz, collecting at least one sample of her urine.3  (R., pp.55-56.)  Both
the State lab and the hospital lab tested Ms. Diaz’s urine.  (See, e.g., R., pp.74-75.)
At Ms. Diaz’s motion, the district court suppressed the results from the State lab’s
test as the product of an unlawful search.  (R., pp.54-58.)  However, the district court
granted the State’s motion to present the hospital’s test results during the trial.4
(Tr., p.314, L.18 - p.315, L.6; see Exhibits, p.12.)  The hospital’s test results, described
as “preliminary” and “presumptive,” indicated the presence of various substances, but
did not indicate in what quantity those substances were present.  (See Exhibits, p.12;
Tr., p.338, L.21 - p.339, L.1.)
3 According to a hospital nurse, she only took one sample with hospital equipment and
sent that sample to the hospital lab.  (Tr., p.298, Ls.8-23, p.321, L.11 - p.322, L.10.)
However, as the district court found in regard to Ms. Diaz’s motion to suppress, a urine
sample had also been collected in an evidence kit provided by the officers.  (R., pp.55-
56.)  The nurse could not account for how the State got a sample of Ms. Diaz’s urine.
(Tr., p.302, L.15 - p.303, L.8.)  As defense counsel argued in response to the State’s
motion to admit the hospital test results, “It’s clear from my review of the medical
records that only one catheter was done.”  (11/2/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.10-11; see also 11/2/15
Tr., p.8, Ls.3-6 (the prosecutor noting “It wasn’t documented in the medical records who
it was that took the State sample.”).)
4 There was no argument that the hospital test results should also be suppressed as a
product of an unlawful search.  (See generally R; see R., pp.95-97 (only challenging the
sufficiency of the foundation evidence offered for admitting those results); Tr., p.313,
L.17 - p.314, L.17 (same).)
5A jury ultimately found Ms. Diaz guilty of driving while under the influence of
drugs.5  (R., p.122.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with
three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.125-27.)  Ms. Diaz filed a Notice of
Appeal timely from the Judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.130-32.)
5 The jury also found Ms. Diaz guilty of a related misdemeanor charge for driving
without privileges.  (R., p.123.)  Additionally, after the jury returned its verdict, Ms. Diaz
admitted to two different alleged sentencing enhancements.  (See generally
Tr., pp.394-400.)
6ISSUE
Whether Officer Moe and Officer Carter offered improper testimony which constitutes
prosecutorial misconduct.
7ARGUMENT
Officer Moe And Officer Carter Offered Improper Testimony Which Constitutes
Prosecutorial Misconduct
A. Standard Of Review
When an error was not objected-to in the district court, the appellate courts will
only review it for fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010).  To
show fundamental error, the defendant must show that one of her unwaived
constitutional rights was violated, that the violation is clear from the record, and that
there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id.
Defendants have a constitutional right to a fair trial and due process therein.
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13.  Prosecutorial misconduct in the
form of eliciting improper testimony can deprive the defendant of those rights. See,
e.g., State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007).
B. Officer Moe’s Impermissible Comment On Ms. Diaz’s Exercise Of Her Fourth
Amendment Right To Refuse To Consent To A Blood Draw Constituted
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Although Officer Moe explained the DRE could be verified by a test of either the
suspect’s urine or blood (Tr., p.200, Ls.16-24), it was clear that the State intended to
use the tests of Ms. Diaz’s urine to meet that requirement in this case.  (See, e.g.,
R., pp.74-75 (the State’s motion to admit the hospital test of Ms. Diaz’s urine after the
State lab tests of Ms. Diaz’s urine had been declared inadmissible).)  In fact, there was
no evidence that a blood test was ever performed.  (See generally R.)  As such, there
was no need to get into anything about a potential blood test during Ms. Diaz’s trial.
Nevertheless, when asked about his discussion with Ms. Diaz in regard to the
8procedure they would use to collect her urine sample, Officer Moe told the jury:  “There
was a discussion of whether she would submit to a blood draw having Meridian Fire and
Paramedics come and take a blood sample from her.  She did not consent to that, but
she did agree to provide a sample at the jail.”  (Tr., p.201, Ls.14-17.)  The comment
about Ms. Diaz’s refusal to submit to a blood draw was a gratuitous and prejudicial
comment on Ms. Diaz’s decision to exercise her Fourth Amendment rights.6
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that eliciting testimony about the defendant’s
exercise of her Fourth Amendment rights constitutes fundamental error. Christiansen,
144 Idaho at 470-71 (cross-applying the rule which developed in regard to violations of
the Fifth Amendment by commenting on the defendant’s silence).  The prohibition
against commenting on a defendant’s exercise of her rights applies equally to police
officers and prosecutors. State v. Ellington,  151  Idaho  53,  61  (2011)  (“As  a
representative of the State, [the officer] had the same duty as the prosecutor not to
improperly comment on Mr. Ellington’s silence.”)  As such, “when an officer of the State
gives any unsolicited testimony that is gratuitous and prejudicial to the defendant, that
testimony will be imputed to the State for purposes of determining prosecutorial
misconduct.” Id.  Therefore, under the first two prongs of Perry, Officer Moe’s testimony
about Ms. Diaz’s exercise of her Fourth Amendment right to not consent to a blood draw
violated one of her unwaived constitutional rights and that error is clear from the record.
Cf. Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 471.
6 Blood draws are searches under the Fourth Amendment. Missouri v. McNeely, ___
U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013).  As such, a defendant has the right to refuse to
consent to such a search. See, e.g., State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646 (2014).
9The only remaining question under Perry is whether there was a reasonable
possibility that error affected the outcome of the trial.  There was such a possibility in
this case.  The only purpose Officer Moe’s improper testimony could serve was to infer
a consciousness of guilt. Cf. Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 470-71 (noting the State
conceded that the sole purpose in eliciting such testimony in that case was to show
consciousness of guilt).  In this case, the jury had already heard Ms. Diaz had
consented to take a breathalyzer, which had come back negative.  (Tr., p.197,
Ls.16-17.)  It had also heard that she had also agreed to provide a urine sample.
(See Tr., p.201, Ls.17-18.)  In fact, Officer Carter testified that Ms. Diaz had been
generally cooperative in their investigation.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.291, Ls.11-15.)  However,
with Officer Moe’s improper comment, the jury now heard that, despite her cooperation
and her trying to show her innocence on those other tests, Ms. Diaz nevertheless
refused to submit to a blood draw.  Thus, the jurors could have inferred she did not want
officers to test her blood because it would show she was presently under the influence
of some drug.
The fact that the jury could infer a consciousness of guilt from Officer Moe’s
testimony is important because the State’s case otherwise hinged on the DRE and the
hospital test results showing she was impaired while she was driving, and there were
serious questions as to whether either of those evaluations actually showed that.  For
example, Ms. Diaz presented within normal limits on most of the physiological tests
conducted during the DRE.  (See generally Tr., pp.257-269.)  And while she did not
pass the psychophysical tests, as Officer Carter admitted, Ms. Diaz’s poor performance
on those tests could have been attributable to her medical conditions, such as her
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fibromyalgia.  (See Tr., p.285, L.16 - p.286, L.4.)  In fact, Officer Carter testified he did
not give particular weight to Ms. Diaz’s failure on one of those tests, the modified
Romberg.  (Tr., p.287, Ls.5-25.)  Thus, based on the testimony given at trial, the
evidence from the DRE showing that Ms. Diaz was actually impaired while she had
been driving that night was questionable at best.
The hospital test results have similar issues.  Notably, they represented only a
“preliminary” or “presumptive” finding, and so, did not indicate the quantity of the
substances present.  (Exhibits, p.12, Tr., p.338, L.21 - p.339, L.1.)  Therefore, that test
could have been identifying trace amounts of substances which Ms. Diaz had ingested
hours, or even days, before.  Given that Ms. Diaz had told officers she had taken
containing those substances a few days prior, it would not be surprising to see traces of
those substances in her urine, but their presence there would not show she was actually
impaired while she had been driving on the night in question.  Thus, the connection
between the hospital test results and the criminal charge in this case is also tenuous.
As the Idaho Supreme Court indicated in Christiansen, when these sort of
questions about the evidence exist, comments on the defendant’s exercise of her
constitutional rights for the purpose of inferring consciousness of guilt is prejudicial.
Specifically, the Christiansen Court explained:  “The evidence was uncontradicted that
the fire was caused by arson and that Christiansen was the only person who had
access to the premises at the time of the fire. If the evidence of Christiansen’s guilt
were less clear-cut, we would vacate the judgment because of the prosecuting
attorney’s misconduct.” Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 471 (emphasis added).  Since the
other evidence of Ms. Diaz’s impairment was far less clear-cut than the evidence in
11
Christiansen, there is a reasonable possibility that Officer Moe’s improper comment
about Ms. Diaz exercise of her Fourth Amendment right prejudiced her, that it affected
the jury’s decision to overlook the problems in the DRE and hospital test results and
convict Ms. Diaz.  Therefore, as the Christiansen Court indicated, the judgment of
conviction should be vacated because of that misconduct.
C. Officer Carter’s Impermissible Opinion Testimony, Which Invaded The Province
Of The Jury By Speaking To The Ultimate Issue In The Case, Constituted
Prosecutorial Misconduct
At the end of his testimony, the prosecutor asked Officer Carter, “[W]hat if any
opinion were you able to form about whether she was impaired?”  (Tr., p.275, Ls.24-25.)
Officer Carter responded, “I came to the determination that she was impaired while she
was operating that vehicle.”  (Tr., p.276, Ls.21-22.)  Admittedly, an expert can, based on
his observation of a person’s performance on tests such as those given during a DRE,
give an opinion that the person was under the influence of drugs. See, e.g., State v.
Gleason, 123 Idaho 623, 66 (1992); State v. Corwin, 147 Idaho 893, 896-97 (Ct. App.
2009).  However, that is not what Officer Carter did in this case.  Instead, he offered the
additional opinion that Ms. Diaz “was impaired while she was operating that vehicle.”
(Tr., p.276, Ls.21-22 (emphasis added).)  That sort of opinion is improper for two
reasons.
First, an opinion which serves to evaluate the circumstances in the case, or in
other words, weigh the evidence, and thus, “render the same conclusion the jury was
asked to render by its verdict,” is impermissible. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 696
(1988).  In DUI cases, the question the jury is asked to decide is: “whether [the
defendant] was or was not guilty of having driven an automobile while under the
12
influence.” Corwin, 147 Idaho at 896-97.  Thus, while an officer can give his opinion
that the defendant is under the influence, or that such impairment could affect his ability
to drive safely, the question of whether the defendant was actually impaired while
driving is a jury question. See id.  Thus, Officer Carter’s testimony on that point speaks
to the question the jury is asked to answer and was based on his evaluation of the
circumstances and weighing of the evidence.  As such, it was not proper opinion
testimony.
Second, “[e]xpert testimony that concerns conclusions or opinions that the
average juror is qualified to draw from the facts utilizing the jurors’ common sense and
normal experience is inadmissible.  This is because the function of the expert is to
provide testimony on subjects that are beyond the common sense, experience and
education of the average juror.” Ellington, 151 Idaho at 66 (internal quotations omitted).
The determination of whether, based on the facts, the impairment Ms. Diaz was
allegedly demonstrating in the DRE actually impaired her while she was driving is a
determination well within the average juror’s ability to make based on application of his
or her common sense and normal experience. Compare Ellington, 151 Idaho at 66-67
(explaining that whether a person had control of his car, and so, could have avoided the
accident in question, was a question the jury could answer without the assistance of an
expert opinion).  In fact, during voir dire, several potential jurors said they were capable
of making precisely that sort of determination.  (Tr., p.117, L.4 - p.121, L.19.)  Because
such a determination was not beyond the scope of what an average juror could draw,
an opinion such as the one Officer Carter offered in this case constitutes “an
inadmissible intrusion into the jury’s domain.” Ellington, 151 Idaho at 67.
13
Admission of this sort of improper opinion testimony may be raised as
fundamental error because it amounts to prosecutorial misconduct which deprives the
defendant of her due process right to a fair trial by a jury.  The Idaho Supreme Court
addressed a similar issue in Ellington.  In that case, an officer who conducted an
accident reconstruction in the case “expressed his opinion based on his specialization
and knowledge in reconstructing the scene of the crash, that the scene indicated that
Mr. Ellington was in ‘full control’ of his vehicle.” Ellington, 151 Idaho at 65.  Later, when
asked about the speeds involved in “the accident,” he testified “I’d like to define this as
an incident, not an accident.” Id. at 66.  There were no objections at that time. Id.
However, during redirect testimony, when the officer again testified “[t]here isn’t an
accident,” the defense objected, arguing that it constituted improper opinion testimony.
Id.
The Ellington Court held that the officer’s testimony that there was “not an
accident” was, in fact, improper opinion testimony because it spoke to a determination
the average juror could make without the assistance of such testimony. Id.   The
Supreme Court added that, “[h]ad Mr. Ellington raised this issue as another instance of
prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, we would have found, once again, that the State’s
conduct was improper.” Id. at 67.  That was so even though the opinion testimony had
not been responsive to the question asked of the witness. Id. at 66-67 (“As an officer of
the State, [the officer’s] gratuitous and prejudicial response is imputed to the State,
whether or not the State intended to elicit that response.”)
Thus, Ellington indicates, even if it is not objected-to as misconduct, the
presentation of this sort of improper testimony to the jury can still be raised on appeal.
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See id.  Furthermore, since that testimony was “an inadmissible intrusion into the jury’s
domain of determining the defendant’s state of mind,” that sort of misconduct would
violate the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial by a jury. See id.  Therefore,
under the first two prongs of Perry, Officer Carter’s improper opinion testimony violated
Ms. Diaz’s unwaived constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial, and that error is
clear from the face of the record.
There is also a reasonable possibility Officer Carter’s improper opinion testimony
affected the outcome of the trial under the third prong of Perry.  As several courts,
including the Idaho Court of Appeals, have recognized, it is reasonable to be concerned
that jurors will defer to an improper expert opinion when weighing the evidence.
See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 857 (Ct. App. 1991) (“In view of the
deference that the jury may have held for the doctor’s testimony,” his improper opinion
testimony about another witness’s credibility should have been excluded); United
States v. Freeman, 730 F.3d 590, 599 (2013) (“An agent presented to a jury with an
aura of expertise and authority increased the risk that the jury will be swayed improperly
by the agent’s testimony, rather than rely on its own interpretation of the evidence.”).7
7 See also United States v. Vera, 770 F.3d 1232, 1243 (9th Cir. 2014) (vacating portions
of a verdict based on the improperly-admitted expert testimony of a federal agent, even
though the defendant had not contemporaneously objected to that testimony, because
of the risk the jury deferred to that improper testimony); United States v. Hampton, 718
F.3d 978, 981-82, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Judicial scrutiny of a law-enforcement
witness’s purported basis for lay opinion is especially important because of the risk that
the jury will defer to the officer’s superior knowledge of the case and past experiences
with similar cases,” and finding the reasonable possibility of such deference indicated
the error in admitting that testimony was not harmless); United States v. Grinage, 390
F.3d 746, 751 (2nd Cir. 2004) (finding that, since the federal agent’s testimony “went to
the crux of the Government’s case and the jury may well have afforded unusual
authority to the agent, who was presented as having expertise, as well as knowledge
beyond that available to the jury,” the admission of the agent’s improper opinion
15
That concern is present in this case since, as discussed in Section B, supra, there were
as to what the DRE, upon which Officer Carter’s opinion was based, actually showed in
terms of Ms. Diaz’s alleged impairment and whether it affected her ability to drive safely.
Therefore, there is a reasonable possibility the jurors set aside their otherwise-
reasonable doubts in that regard and relied on the Officer Carter’s improper opinion
testimony on that issue instead.
As such, there is a reasonable possibility Officer Carter’s improper opinion
testimony affected the outcome in this case, and thus, that misconduct was prejudicial
to Ms. Diaz.  Therefore, she should be afforded relief for that fundamental error as well.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Diaz respectfully requests this Court vacate the verdict and judgment of
conviction in this case and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this * day of *, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
testimony was not harmless); cf. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007)
(explaining that prosecutorial misconduct in the closing argument is problematic
because prosecutors (like the officers in Ms. Diaz’s case) “‘occupy an official position,
which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their statements, action and
conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will counsel
for the accused.’”) (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44 (1903)); Reynolds v. State,
126 Idaho 24, 30 (Ct. App. 1994) (“Experts often possess special knowledge or training,
giving their opinions of credibility great weight in the minds of the jury.”)
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